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Abstract 
Civic Engagement and Corruption in 20 European Democracies 
Nicolas Grießhaber and Benny Geys 
This paper analyzes the relation between different forms of civic engagement and 
corruption. This first of all extends earlier analysis linking generalized trust to corruption 
by incorporating another element from the social capital complex (namely formal forms of 
civic engagement). Second, based on the idea that social networks’ beneficial or harmful 
impact may depend on their characteristics, it investigates how the structure of social 
networks (i.e., inclusive vs. exclusive and isolated vs. connected) matters. Evaluating the 
engagement – corruption nexus for a cross-section of 20 European democracies in 
2002/2003, we confirm that social networks are linked to corruption even when 
controlling for the effect of generalized trust, and that their relation to corruption is type-
specific. These findings survive under various model specifications and robustness checks. 
Keywords: Corruption, civil society, networks, voluntary associations, European social survey   1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although some scholars emphasize potential beneficial impacts of corruption – most often 
understood as the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ (e.g., Bardhan 1997, p. 1321; 
Treisman 2000, p. 399) – on bureaucratic efficiency and economic development (e.g., Leff 
1964; Klitgaard 1988; for empirical support, see Egger and Winner 2005; Méon and Weill 
2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011), corruption today is widely believed to be inimical to self-
sustaining growth and development (e.g., Tanzi 1998; Jain 2001). Consequently, there 
developed a significant body of academic work that analyzes the determinants of corruption 
in order to uncover elements that might facilitate it, or assist its prevention (for reviews, see 
Svensson 2005, Seldadyo and De Haan 2006; Treisman 2007).  
 
A recent strand in this research tradition addresses the potential relation between social 
capital (i.e., ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks’; Putnam 
1993, p. 167) and corruption (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Bjørnskov 2003; Uslaner 2004; 
Delhey and Newton 2005; Lambsdorff 2007). The present paper adds to this literature in three 
main ways.  
 
  First, research to date concentrates almost exclusively on the effect of trust as a 
component of social capital, arguing that ‘higher levels of honesty and trust that others 
will conform to a given set of norms’ lead to lower corruption (Bjørnskov 2003, p. 3; 
see also La Porta et al. 1997; Uslaner 2004; Delhey and Newton 2005; for an alternative 
view, see Lambsdorff 2007). Yet, as mentioned, the social capital concept is broader 
than trust (Putnam 1993; Coffé and Geys 2005; Sabatini 2009). Hence, concentrating 
only on the effect of trust gives, at best, a partial view of the social capital—corruption 
relation. Explicitly acknowledging social capital as a multidimensional concept, this 
study incorporates formal networks of civic engagement into the analysis. By 
evaluating a different aspect of the social capital complex (while controlling for trust), 
this allows generating a more complete view of the link between corruption and social 
capital.
1  
  Second, while most social capital scholars stress trust’s positive consequences (see 
above), this effect might well be particular to generalized rather than particularized 
trust (Warren 2004).
2 Indeed, Harris (2007) reveals that indicators of strong ties, family 
orientations and particularized trust are associated with significantly higher corruption. 
Similarly, while social capital theory generally emphasizes the beneficial role of social 
networks for society (e.g., Putnam 1993; see, however, critical discussions in Levi 
1996; Foley and Edwards 1998; Zmerli, 2010) – thus predicting lower corruption with 
increasing civic engagement – research on interest-group politics (e.g., Olson, 1965, 
1982; Grossman and Helpman 2001) generates the reverse prediction. Our analysis adds 
to the literature by explicitly evaluating these potential ‘dark shades’ of social capital 
(van Deth 2010, p. 640; see also Iglič 2010; Zmerli 2010). 
  Finally, as the relative importance of the positive and negative effects indicated above 
might depend on networks’ constituting features, we analyze to what extent the relation 
                                                 
1   While O’Connell (2003, p. 243) employs the ‘average number of organizational memberships per person’ as 
a measure of social capital and connects this to ‘the perception of corruption in each society’, his work does 
not simultaneously control for the effect of trust – as we do – nor does he assess the potentially different 
roles played by various types of associations (see below). 
2   Unlike particularized trust, which is based on personal knowledge and, hence, restricted to a specific social 
unit (Freitag et al. 2009), generalized trust can be defined as an ‘estimate of the probability of 
trustworthiness, p*, for the average person’ (Coleman 1990, p. 104). It is therefore independent of specific 
persons or groups, and based on the assumption that most people are part of the own ‘moral community’ 
(Uslaner 2003).   2
between formal networks of civic engagement and corruption depends on these 
networks’ characteristics. The central differentiation – defined in more detail below – is 
thereby based on their constitutive purposes (inclusive vs. exclusive associations; 
Warren 2001, 2004; Zmerli 2003) as well as their connectedness to other networks 
(isolated vs. connected associations; Paxton 2002, 2007). This allows analyzing recent 
arguments stating that social networks based on exclusiveness and social isolation may 
promote opportunism, strong in-group cohesion and favouritism instead of civic virtues 
(e.g., Paxton 1999, 2002, 2007; Putnam 2000).
3 
 
Using a sample of 20 European democracies and employing the Corruption Perceptions Index 
of Transparency International as the central dependent variable our results show that the 
density of social networks in a society adds to the explanatory power of the model even when 
controlling for the effect of generalized trust. This provides strong evidence that civil society 
matters beyond breeding social trust. Moreover, the relation between social networks and 
corruption depends on their type: inclusive organizations are associated with lower corruption 
and exclusive organizations with higher corruption. Overall, our results thus provide evidence 
that, although civic engagement on the whole is connected to lower corruption, high levels of 
certain types of civic engagement are actually linked to higher, rather than lower, corruption. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of social 
capital, emphasizes the role of social networks as a structural component thereof, and outlines 
our main hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the empirical methodology, while our results are 
discussed in section 4. The last section concludes.  
 
 
II.  NETWORKS OF VOLUNTARY CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION 
Over the last 20 years, ‘social capital’ has been linked – in an exploding body of research – to 
numerous positive societal, economic and political outcomes including lower crime rates 
(e.g., Messner et al. 2004), improved economic development (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997) 
as well as the rise and persistence of democracies and the performance of governments 
(Putnam 1993; Paxton 2002; Coffé and Geys 2005; Tavits 2006). Social capital is thereby 
most often understood to refer to ‘social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam 2000, p. 19), and thus complements physical 
capital, which refers to material objects, and human capital, which is embodied in personal 
qualities and skills of individuals. For most scholars, social capital therefore entails a 
combination of structural and cultural elements (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Coffé and Geys 
2005, 2006; Sabatini 2009; van Deth 2010). The latter incorporate aspects of interpersonal 
trust, social values and norms of reciprocity. The structural component refers to social 
networks and interpersonal relations, either formal or informal (Pichler and Wallace 2007).  
 
Unlike previous corruption work (see above), this study focuses on the latter pillar of social 
capital, measured as ‘social connectedness through associational life’ (Freitag 2006, p. 124), 
while controlling for potential effects of the former (i.e., trust). According to social capital 
                                                 
3   Some recent studies have similarly addressed potential differences between the effects of various types of 
social networks (i.e., friends, family, voluntary organizations) on economic development and growth (e.g., 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2003; Sabatini 2009). However, such studies often implicitly presuppose that all 
voluntary associations have the same effect. Yet, in reality, there is likely to be significant variability across 
such associations (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997; Paxton 1999; Zmerli 2003; Coffé and Geys, 2007; van Deth 
2010). Using recently-developed methodological tools, this variability will be explicitly taken into account 
and exploited in our analysis (see below).   3
scholars, social networks can affect corruption via two mechanisms. First, networks of civic 
engagement have been argued to promote development of norms of reciprocity and social 
values (Putnam 1993), which can easily spill over beyond the immediate group (e.g., Newton 
2006). By thus promoting democratic skills and attitudes, formal social networks negatively 
affect the occurrence of corruption. Second, social networks’ structures allow people to 
become part of the political process (Putnam 1993; Boix and Posner 1998; Jottier and 
Heyndels, 2011). They increase political awareness (e.g., Scheufele et al. 2004) as well as 
voters’ ability to ‘more easily overcome the collective action problem in monitoring officials’ 
(Knack 2002, p. 273; Jottier and Heyndels, 2011). This implies that, in a society with a dense 
network of civic engagement, the probability to detect illicit rent extraction is higher, which, 
as a result, decreases corruption (cf. Shleifer and Vishny 1993). In both cases, a flourishing 
associational life creates an environment unfavourable to the development of widespread 
corruption.  
 
H1a:  Societies with high civic engagement experience a lower level of corruption.   
Yet, social networks might not only teach civic skills, social responsibility and cooperation. 
Strong group ties might also be bad for society (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Foley and 
Edwards 1998). The Weimar Republic in Germany, for instance, had a very vibrant civic life, 
but its organization of associations along existing social cleavages has been argued to 
reinforce rather than defeat narrow, group-specific interests (Berman 1997). Similarly, Olson 
(1982) argues that specialized interest groups have a stronger incentive to engage in costly 
and inefficient rent-seeking than to work toward the ‘common good’. This idea has 
subsequently become central to a large political economics literature on special interest 
groups (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2001). Its line of argument implies a hypothesis directly 
opposite to H1a; namely, that civic engagement might increase corruptive practices. 
 
H1b:  Societies with high civic engagement experience a higher level of corruption.   
Because social networks differ with respect to their characteristics, purposes and members, it 
is conceivable that the (positive or negative) effect of a given social network depends on its 
design. To evaluate this, we regard two differentiations recently proposed in the literature: 
i.e., based on networks’ constitutive purposes (inclusive vs. exclusive associations; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Zmerli 2003) or their connectedness to other networks (isolated vs. connected 
associations; Paxton 2002, 2007). 
 
The distinction between exclusive and inclusive social capital captures the difference between 
networks or organizations that are based on a strong in-group/out-group distinction and 
inward-orientation (i.e., focused predominantly on members’ personal interests), and those 
with a broader, societal focus that reach across the boundaries of the organization (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Zmerli 2003).
4 The idea – in part inspired by the distinction between strong and 
weak ties put forward by Granovetter (1973) – is that the former networks enforce exclusive 
group identities and build strong in-group cohesion, but are less integrated into the broader 
community and thereby contain the risk of negative externalities and strong out-group 
antagonisms (Zmerli 2003, Freitag et al. 2009, van Deth and Zmerli 2010). Strong in-group 
orientation and specific reciprocity may indeed lead members to develop feelings of 
obligation to favour and support people from the same group, which may support corruptive 
practices (Harris 2007). Fukuyama (2000, p. 8) even sees this as a ‘cultural foundation for 
                                                 
4   According to these same authors, human rights and environmental organizations are typical examples of 
inclusive networks, while professional interest groups, social clubs and student fraternities are key examples 
of exclusive groups (more details below).   4
corruption’. Societies can thus ‘be rich in social capital within social groups, and yet 
experience debilitating poverty, corruption and conflict’ (Narayan 1999, p. 8, italics added). 
Inclusive networks, on the other hand, strive for collective goods and therefore possess an 
outward orientation (Zmerli 2003, van Deth and Zmerli 2010), making them more likely to 
generate civic virtues, ‘broader identities and reciprocity’ (Putnam 2000, p. 22n; Freitag et al. 
2009, Zmerli 2010). Hence, inclusive associations should be more likely to generate public-
spiritedness and interest in the common good, which have been argued to reduce corruption. 
This line of argument leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2:  The level of corruption decreases with the density of inclusive social networks. 
H3:  The level of corruption increases with the density of exclusive social networks. 
While the distinction between inclusive and exclusive networks emphasizes the structure 
within individual organizations, the differentiation between connected and isolated networks 
(Paxton 2002, 2007) focuses on the structure between associations. Social networks thereby 
count as well-connected when they ‘are linked to other voluntary associations through the 
multiple memberships of their members’ (Paxton 2007, p. 51). Such  multiple affiliations 
‘generate organizational embeddedness’ (Cornwell and Harrison 2004, p. 863), which 
facilitates the development of between-group trust because members know at least some 
people in other groups and parts of society. Reversely, isolated networks can be expected to 
mainly develop strong internal ties, social closure and in-group cohesion (Granovetter 1973). 
This, as mentioned, reduces their incentive to work towards the common good, and might 
motivate the pursuit of narrow group interests. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  A high density of connected social networks is linked to less corruption, while a 
high density of isolated social networks is linked to higher corruption. 
 
Before we turn to the empirical analysis, it is important to point out that our hypotheses 
suggest that causality runs from involvement in social networks to corruption. Although some 
existing theoretical and empirical research  supports this by pointing towards a causal effect 
of trust on corruption (Putnam 1993; Bjørnskov 2003; Uslaner 2004), the question of 
causality remains open (e.g., the reverse direction of causation is supported by You 2006; 
Rothstein 2006; Lambsdorff 2007). Indeed, higher corruption might lead people to place less 
trust in political institutions (e.g., Morris and Klesner 2010) and, as a consequence, to rely 
more heavily on themselves or closely-knit personal networks rather than, say, society-
oriented groups. We return to this discussion below. 
 
 
III. DATA AND METHOD 
To evaluate the relation between engagement in social networks and corruption, we estimate – 
using OLS – the following estimation equation (with subscript i for country): 
 
 CPIi = a + b1 Networksi + b2 Controlsi + ei 
We test this model using a sample of 20 European democracies. While corruption data are 
more widely available, our sample size is restricted because data on social networks are 
extracted from the 2002/2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS). Hence, only 
countries participating in this round could be included (more details in section III.2). Even   5
though other surveys such as the World Values Survey (WVS) would offer a broader sample, 
we prefer to use the ESS because it provides detailed information on civic engagement in 
voluntary associations and its methodology is robust across participating countries.
5  
 
III.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
for the year 2003.  Although there are other measures of corruption perceptions (e.g., World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, International Country Risk Guide), these are generally 
extremely highly correlated with each other. We rely on CPI as it is probably ‘the most 
widely known corruption indicator’ (Knack and Azfar 2003, p. 6) and a standard choice in the 
literature (e.g., O’Connell, 2003). CPI is a composite index, aggregating different polls of 
business people and assessments by country analysts on perceived corruption at the country 
level. These data are standardized using non-parametric statistics ensuring the index to range 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). The resulting index is presented in Figure 1. It 
shows that corruption perceptions are lowest in the Scandinavian countries (with Finland 
ranked first among all countries for which the index is computed). The highest corruption 
perceptions in our sample are observed for the Eastern and Southern European countries. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Clearly, as the CPI is based on subjective perceptions rather than real corruption, it bears the 
risk of bias due to rumours, prejudice, country stereotypes, media attention, previous 
corruption ratings or macro factors like a country’s economic performance (Lambsdorff 2003; 
Søreide 2003). While acknowledging their potential influence, more direct measures of 
corruption – such as convictions for corruption – are unable to capture undetected corruption 
and often end up measuring other aspects such as the quality of law enforcement (Ades and 
Di Tella 1997). Moreover, as it is impossible to have anything near perfect information about 
the extent of corruption, people in the end have to act on their perceptions. Hence, we prefer 
to nonetheless rely on the CPI, which also makes our results more directly comparable to 
those of O’Connell (2003). 
 
We should also note that an ideal sample to examine how the structure of civil society impacts 
upon corruption would include developing and transition countries. Given our reliance upon 
ESS data, such countries could unfortunately not be included in the present analysis. 
Nonetheless, the limited variation in our dependent variable that derives from using 20 
European countries also has a bright side as it increases the difficulty to find significant 
relations. Hence, our sample can be seen a least-likely case for uncovering structural effects, 
making it a strong test of the hypotheses derived above. 
 
III.2. Main independent variables 
Networksi is a vector incorporating information about involvement in formal social networks 
in country i. This is measured using information on participation in and voluntary work for 
voluntary associations and is extracted from the European Social Survey (ESS). For each of 
12 association types (Sports/outdoor activity, culture/hobby, trade union, professional, 
consumer, Humanitarian/human rights, Environment/peace/animal rights, Religious, Political, 
                                                 
5   The ESS is a biennial survey with minimum effective sample size of 1,500 respondents for each country 
(800 for countries with a population below 2 million). The first round (2002/2003) was carried out in 22 
European countries and contained a special focus on civic engagement. Note that the civic engagement 
questions were not included in Switzerland and the Czech Republic, such that these countries are excluded.   6
Education/teachers/parents, Social club, other), respondents are asked whether they were a 
member, have participated, donated money or did voluntary work over the preceding 12 
months. To most closely capture the idea that respondents are actively involved in a formal, 
institutionalized social network, we focus on participation and voluntary work instead of mere 
membership. Importantly, the exact content of this ‘Networks’ vector differs across the 
various models we analyze. Indeed, when evaluating H1a and H1b, we include the percentage 
of respondents in country i that acknowledge active participation or voluntary work in at least 
one type of association. For hypotheses 2 through 4, we separate this information in two 
different categorizations. 
 
First, to distinguish inclusive from exclusive networks, we follow Zmerli (2003) by 
identifying the basic purpose – or ‘constitutive goods’ (Warren 2001) – of each association 
type.
6  We thereby distinguish six ‘constitutive goods’: individual material goods, status 
goods, group identity goods, public material goods, inclusive social goods and interpersonal 
identity goods (Warren 2001; Zmerli 2003). As the main foundation and central inspiration 
for the ideals and aims of a voluntary association, these constitutive goods should have a 
significant impact on determining the character of the organization. The idea underlying the 
inclusive/exclusive networks distinction then is that groups focusing on individual-oriented 
goods such as personal material, status or group identity goods are more likely to generate 
exclusiveness (Zmerli 2003; van Deth and Zmerli 2010). Pursuing personal material interests 
(or ‘individual material goods’) does not necessarily require collective action and even when 
it does its aim lies in narrow self-interest. As such, the pursuit of such goods is unlikely to 
help foster inclusive networks that espouse civic virtues. Examples of voluntary associations 
pursuing such aims include farmers unions and business lobbies (Zmerli 2003), which mainly 
aim at improving the material situation of a (very) limited, well-defined section of society. 
Instead of material interests, ‘status goods’ refer to symbolic values that are excludable – such 
as social status, degrees or titles. A central focus on such status goods likewise generates 
exclusiveness, since solidarity and empathy are more likely to be restricted to those who share 
the same status. An example concerns social clubs or certain professional organizations, 
where the in-group defines itself through some characteristic that is, by definition, absent in 
the out-group. Similar reasoning applies to groups that are defined by specific characteristics 
of its members such as gender, age, ethnicity or language (‘group identity goods’; e.g., 
women or youth organizations). In both cases, exclusive identities and strong in-group 
cohesion are likely to be enforced and groups having such goods as their basic purpose are 
more likely to generate exclusive social capital. 
 
On the other hand, groups that pursue ‘public material goods’ which are scarce, non-
excludable and beneficial for the wider society are likely to enhance civic values, social 
responsibility and an outward-orientation. The reason is that they remind their members of 
individual interdependencies and the need for collective action (e.g., environmental groups; 
Zmerli 2003). In addition, organizations that are devoted to preserving common resources and 
values such as language, culture, societal ideals and identities (‘inclusive social goods’; e.g., 
human rights associations and cultural groups) as well as associations based on strong 
interpersonal relations (‘interpersonal identity’) that teach their members empathy and trust 
(e.g., sports and hobby clubs, parents associations) are also assumed to enhance civic values, 
social responsibility, outward-orientation and an inclusive character (Zmerli 2003). This 
discussion leads to the designation of trade unions, professional associations, consumer and 
social clubs, youth, elderly and women’s organizations as predominantly exclusive. Sports, 
hobby, humanitarian, environmental, animal rights, parent/teacher associations as well as 
                                                 
6   Evidently, we exclude the ‘other’ category in making this distinction (and similarly below).   7
church groups and political parties are designated as predominantly inclusive (see Table 1 
below, based on Zmerli 2003). The final network-variables measure the percentage of 
respondents in country i that state active participation or voluntary work in at least one 
association defined as inclusive and exclusive, respectively. 
 
We should note here that, though we chose to follow the allocation made in earlier work 
(especially Zmerli, 2003) for reasons of comparability, these allocations may not be without 
criticism. For instance, one might argue that church groups are mainly based on exclusive 
group identities (i.e., religious denomination). However, in most cases, such groups arguably 
aim at enhancing broader identities and solidarity which go beyond the mere members of the 
group, giving such networks a more inclusive character (see Zmerli, 2003). Similarly, 
political parties might be argued to pursue the interests of their clientele. Nevertheless, a more 
benevolent (and possibly naïve, but certainly less cynical) view of politics starts from the 
perspective that politicians represent the population and are concerned with the provision of 
public goods to the benefit of society.
7 
 
 [Table 1 around here] 
Second, to differentiate connected and isolated organizations, we follow Paxton (2002, 2007) 
and Freitag et al. (2009) in calculating the average number of additional association types in 
which active participants of a given group are likewise involved. Unlike these authors, 
however, we correct this number for the relative size of each association type in each country. 
Not doing so ‘would unduly benefit (punish) small (large) groups since all [participants] of a 
small group can also be [participants] of a large group, but not the other way round’ (Geys 
and Murdoch 2010, p. 4). The reason is that, since links between associations are necessarily 
symmetric, ‘the size of the groups distinguished by a given parameter is inversely related to 
the extent of their intergroup relations’ (Blau 1977, p. 24).
8 Once again following Paxton 
(2002, 2007), we then designate the three association types with the lowest level of 
(corrected) interconnections as isolated, and all others as connected (note that the exact 
delineation of association types across this typology thereby differs across countries; details 
provided in Table A2 in Appendix A).
9 The final network-variables in this case equal the 
percentage of respondents in country i that state active participation or voluntary work in at 
least one association defined as isolated or connected, respectively. 
 
III.3. Control variables 
Clearly, as we have a maximum of 20 countries, only a limited number of control variables 
can be included simultaneously in the estimations to avoid running out of degrees of freedom. 
While we experimented with an extensive battery of control variables (see also below), our 
baseline model always includes GDP per capita (measured in 2000 to mitigate concerns of 
endogeneity bias and taken from the OECD Factbook). Inclusion of this variable appears a 
                                                 
7   With respect to religious groups, we also ran all regressions below excluding religious organizations – as 
suggested by Putnam (1993). This leaves our results qualitatively unaffected. 
8   This correction involves a simple OLS regression where the average number of participations of individuals 
participating in a given association type in country i is the dependent variable and the total number of 
participants of these same association types in a given country the explanatory variable. Higher (lower) 
residuals from this regression indicate associations having more (less) interconnections than its participant-
base would suggest, implying higher (lower) connectedness net of the participant-size effect (see also Coffé 
and Geys 2008; Geys and Murdoch 2008). 
9   While this follows Paxton (2002, 2007), selection of just three associations as isolated is obviously ad hoc. 
Still, re-estimating the model taking four associations as isolated, makes no difference to the results 
(available upon request).   8
basic requirement as earlier work has consistently shown it to be a core determinant of 
corruption (Seldadyo and De Haan 2006; Treisman 2007). Further, we also always introduce 
the level of generalized trust in a society. This variable is important for our analysis as this 
main cultural component of social capital not only controls for the potential direct impact of 
trust (as identified by, e.g., Bjørnskov 2003; Uslaner 2004), but also evaluates the indirect 
effect of social networks via their impact on interpersonal trust (or, reversely, how such trust 
affects membership; see Sønderskov 2011).
10  Summary statistics and definitions for these 
variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
As mentioned, in order to mitigate potential omitted variable bias, we experimented with a 
large number of alternative specifications and variables that were identified in the literature as 
potential influences on a country’s level of perceived corruption (e.g., Mauro 1995; Ades and 
di Tella 1999; La Porta et al 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Paldam 2002; Gerring and Thacker 
2005; You and Khagram 2005): e.g., income inequality, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
trade as a share of GDP, ratio of children enrolled for secondary education, World Bank 
Governance Indicators (i.e., government effectiveness and regulatory quality, see Kaufmann 
et al. 2003), decentralization, legal tradition, percentage of respondents belonging to specific 
religious denominations, north/south dummies, and so on. None of these variables’ inclusion 
(or exclusion) affected the qualitative interpretation of the main findings for the baseline 
model reported below and we therefore, for reasons of parsimony, confined our main 
empirical model to the core variables described above (details available upon request). 
 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table 2 reports our main results. In models (1) and (2), we examine the relationship between 
corruption and voluntary associations in general, such as to address H1a and H1b. In model 
(2), we thereby control for the level of generalized trust, while in model (1) we do not – such 
as to evaluate the indirect effect of trust through associations. In the remaining columns, we 
distinguish between inclusive and exclusive (model (3)) as well as between connected and 
isolated (model (4)) social networks. Finally, in model (5), we introduce both differentiations 
at the same time to check the extent to which they are measuring similar effects (Geys and 
Murdoch 2008, 2010). 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
Table 2 first of all indicates that, as in the preceding literature, GDP per capita acts as a 
central economic determinant of corruption perceptions, also within the current sample of 
European countries (see Paldam 2002; Treisman 2007). Generalized trust is, in line with 
previous findings, likewise found to be very important and generates a noted increase in the 
explanatory power of the model: i.e., trusting societies show lower levels of perceived 
corruption (see also La Porta et al. 1997; Bjørnskov 2003; Uslaner 2004; Delhey and Newton 
2005).  
 
                                                 
10   Generalized trust is measured using respondents’ answers to: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ We use the average score for 
each country, which lies on a scale from 0 (‘you can’t be too careful’) to 10 (‘most people can be trusted’). 
Although the credibility of this measure depends on what respondents understand under ‘most people’ (i.e., 
the so-called ‘radius of trust’ problem), recent research has shown that the “question seems to work well in 
Western and affluent nations” (Delhey et al., 2011: 25), which are the focus of the current analysis.   9
Turning to our central variables, we first of all find that active involvement in voluntary 
associations is consistently positively correlated to the perception of a countries’ level of 
corruption (remember that higher numbers on CPI indicate lower corruption perceptions, such 
that civic engagement links to lower corruption). This effect remains even after controlling for 
important background variables such as generalized trust and GDP. Specifically, we observe 
that the coefficient estimate and significance level both decrease significantly with the 
inclusion of generalized trust in model (2), which suggests that at least part of associational 
involvement’s correlation runs indirectly through social trust. However, given that 
introducing generalized trust does not eliminate the significance of the civic engagement 
variables, our findings strongly suggest that civil society matters beyond breeding social trust. 
These results thus provide significant support for H1a rather than H1b. In general, societies 
with high active involvement in civic engagement are characterized by a lower level of 
corruption (even in our sample of developed European countries). Still, the observed 
association remains relatively modest as a one standard deviation change in involvement 
relates to a change in corruption perceptions equal to roughly one third of its standard 
deviation (evaluated at the mean value). One possible reason for this modest effect, as argued 
in section 2, might be that there are opposing effects from different association types.  
 
This argument is substantiated in the remainder of Table 2. Indeed, in line with H2 and H3, 
the share of inhabitants actively involved in inclusive, outward-oriented formal social 
networks goes hand in hand with lower levels of corruption, while participation or voluntary 
work for social networks characterized by exclusive group identities and an inward-
orientation are linked with higher levels of corruption (see model (3)). Even after controlling 
for trust and GDP, this difference in the coefficient estimates of inclusive and exclusive 
networks is statistically highly significant (as shown at the bottom of Table 2). Moreover, 
there is a further sizable increase in the explanatory power of the model (from 87.7% of 
variance explained in model (2) to 91.1% explained in model (3)). This indicates that 
differentiating both types of networks provides a better explanation for cross-country 
variation in corruption perceptions than taking all associations as a common factor. A similar 
differentiated effect cannot, however, be observed for isolated versus connected social 
networks (see model (4)). As such, we cannot substantiate H4. The distinction between 
inclusive and exclusive networks therefore appears to be the more important one.
11 Note, 
finally, that including measures for both differentiations (see model (5)) leads to 
insignificance of all network variables due to severe multicollinearity problems (correlations 
between these measures lie above 0.80, while their Variance Inflation Factors are consistently 
well above the commonly proposed threshold value of 20).  
 
As mentioned above, these basic results are robust to the inclusion of any of the additional 
control variables listed at the end of section III.3 – severely mitigating any concern that our 
results are driven by the exclusion of important control variables. They are also robust to 
using alternative specifications for the dependent variable. Indeed, similar results are obtained 
when using the average CPI over the 2002-2004 period, the CPI index for 2010 as well as the 
average CPI over the period 2008-2010. While the former intends to mitigate the potential 
effect of measurement error in the annual data, the latter two specifications provide a partial 
attempt to weaken concerns about reverse causality (as current corruption perceptions cannot 
                                                 
11   Note that all models were tested for influential cases using Cook’s D as test statistic. Exclusion of such 
cases leaves our results qualitatively unaffected (details available upon request). If anything, removing any 
outliers tends to slightly improve our results.   10
logically affect involvement in 2002/2003).
12 In this respect, it is important to observe that the 
year-on-year CPI data generally show a correlation in excess of 0.985 in our sample, but that 
such correlation is somewhat less extreme when comparing the data for 2003 and 2010 
(r<0.93). Although the explanatory power of models using more recent CPI data is, as might 
be expected, significantly lower (with R
2 around 82% to 85%), this reduction is mainly  due 
to the weaker explanatory power of GDP in such models. The core findings with respect to 
association memberships remain robust. Finally, it is important to note that Table 2 only 
regards active participation or voluntary work. Given the controversy in the literature about 
the benefit of active face-to-face interactions versus passive involvement in formal social 
networks, we replicated our analysis using measures of civic engagement that are more 
closely aligned to passive involvement (i.e., dues-paying memberships). As before, we find 
that the type of civic engagement plays an important intervening role, in line with our main 
theoretical argument (full results available upon request). 
 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study assessed the relation between formal social networks of civic engagement and 
corruption perceptions in 20 European democracies. This adds to the literature on the social 
capital—corruption nexus (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Bjørnskov 2003; Uslaner 2004) by 
introducing the main structural – rather than cultural (i.e., interpersonal trust, social values 
and norms) – component of social capital. Moreover, we explicitly accounted for the 
possibility that formal social networks might not merely link to social goods, but to social 
harms as well. 
 
Our empirical results first of all show that the level of perceived corruption in a country is 
significantly associated with a society’s degree of civic engagement in formal social 
networks. However, and crucially, not all types of associations share the same positive 
correlation. Distinguishing between inclusive and exclusive networks – based on the basic 
purpose of the respective social networks – revealed that only involvement in the former is 
associated with lower corruption, while involvement in the latter actually shows the reverse 
tendency. This suggests that public investments supporting civic engagement in general may 
not have the desired effect on the prevalence of corruptive practices in society (for a similar 
argument in a different setting, see Grajzl and Murrell 2009).  
 
Even though our results are supportive of theoretical expectations, they also call for further 
research. First, the sample’s restriction to European democracies makes for a strong test (due 
to the limited variation in corruption), but also limits generalizability of the results. To 
address this, broader studies including developing countries – where corruption can be a more 
considerable concern – should be conducted. Secondly, the most recent wave of the ESS 
(fielded in 2010/11) includes questions about individuals’ perceptions of corruption (ESS, 
2010). Once these data become publicly available, they will allow for individual- and multi-
level analyses of the social capital-corruption nexus, which is likely to provide important new 
insights. Finally, although social networks’ coefficient estimates retain statistical significance 
after controlling for critical variables such as GDP and trust, these variables are obviously 
closely related. Future work should investigate more closely the exact relationship between 
social networks and generalized trust – especially with respect to different types of social 
networks – to more clearly define the causal pathways in which the associations observed 
here work. 
                                                 
12   Unfortunately, a more direct approach to address the causality issue using instrumental variable techniques 
is unfeasible by the lack of viable instruments. This is why we refrain from drawing final causal inferences 
throughout the paper.   11
Figure 1: Perceived Corruption (CPI 2003) 
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Source: Transparency International; Index ranges between 10 (highly clean) and
               0 (highly corrupt).
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Table 1: Constitutive goods of exclusive and inclusive networks 
 
Organization Constitutive  Good 
Exclusive  







Social Club, Young/Elderly/ 
Women Societies 
Status Goods/                           
Exclusive Group Identity 
Inclusive  
Sport/Outdoor Acivity  Interpersonal Identity 




Environment/Peace/Animal Rights  Public Material/ Inclusive Social 
Church/Religious Organization  Interpersonal Identity/ Inclusive Social 
Political Party  Public Material 
Science/Education/Teachers/Parents Interpersonal Identity/ Inclusive Social 
The assignment of constitutive goods and the distinction between exclusive and 
inclusive organizations follow Zmerli (2003).  
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Table 2: Voluntary Associations and Corruption: Do Association Types Matter? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Involvement  -0.0766 **  -0.0439 **  -  -  - 
 (0.0174)  (0.0164)       
Exclusive Associations  -  -  -0.111 **  -  -0.0618 
     (0.0485)  (0.0948) 
Inclusive Associations  -  -  0.0991 **  -  0.220 
     (0.0325)    (0.220) 
Isolated  Associations  - - -  0.0321  -0.0288 
       (0.0584)  (0.0996) 
Connected  Associations  - - -  0.0319  -0.131 
       (0.0245)  (0.222) 
Log of GDP per Capita  1.928 ***  1.300 **  1.245 **  1.350 **  1.347 ** 
  (0.362) (0.462) (0.435) (0.519) (0.505) 
Generalized Trust  -  0.820 ***  0.839 ***  0.818 **  0.826 ** 
    (0.237) (0.176) (0.336) (0.225) 
Constant  -14.97 -11.54 -10.95 -11.83 -11.95 
  (3.228) (4.135) (4.065) (4.452) (4.677) 
Observations  20 20 20 20 20 
R-Squared  0.799 0.877 0.911 0.870 0.916 













Note: Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses; levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Excl=Incl and Iso=Conn test the significance of the difference in coefficient estimates between both association 
groups. The test statistic has a Chi
2 distribution with one degree of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics of metric variables 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Source  Description 
CPI 2003  20  7.285  1.78  3.6  9.7  Transparancy 
International 
Continuous index on scale from 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) 
Active  Involvement  20  37.65 13.80 12.66 53.25  ESS,  own 
calculations 
Percentage of respondents active in at 
least one association type 
Active in Exclusive Associations  20  14.21  6.31  4.42  25.03  ESS, own 
calculations 
Percentage of respondents active in at 
least one exclusive association 
Active in Inclusive Associations   20  30.83  12.43  9.28  45.70  ESS, own 
calculations 
Percentage of respondents active in at 
least one inclusive association 
Active in Isolated Associations  20  13.61  5.88  4.66  25.54  ESS, own 
calculations 
Percentage of respondents active in at 
least one isolated association 
Active in Connected Associations  20  30.42  12.66  8.98  48.34  ESS, own 
calculations 
Percentage of respondents active in at 
least one connected association 
GDP per capita 2000  20  25,447.15  9,029.123  10,555  53,315  OECD Factbook  In US-Dollars, 
Generalized  Trust  20  5.01 0.97 3.64 6.99  ESS,  own 
calculations 
Average trust of respondents between 
0 (you cannot be too careful) and 10 
(most people can be trusted) 
Note:   Entries for variables extracted from the ESS (involvement in voluntary associations, generalized trust) present summary statistics for the sample of countries and not the underlying individual 
data.   20
Table A2: Isolated and connected associations (based on average number of memberships) 
 
Organization  AT BE DE DK ES  FI FR GB GR HU 
Sport/Outdoor Activity  2.7 (0.002)  2.3 (-0.008)  2.1 (-0.003)  2.0 (0.124)  2.2 (0.029)  1.8 (-0.048)  2.1 (0.057)  2.2 (0.174)  2.0 (0.035) 2.3  (0.165) 
Cultural/Hobby Club  2.9 (0.252)  2.8 (0.154)  2.5 (0.139)  2.4 (0.141)  2.6 (0.311)  2.1 (0.084)  2.3 (0.191)  2.6 (0.200)  2.1 (0.280) 2.4  (0.390) 
Trade Union  3.4 (-0.179)
i 3.4  (-0.434)
i 2.4  (-0.343)
i 2.4  (-0.224)
i 2.6  (-0.054) 2.1  (-0.254)
i  3.0 (-0.010)  3.4 (0.130)  2.0 (-0.053)  2.1 (-0.938)
i 
Bus./Prof./ Farmers Org.  3.9 (0.359)  3.4 (-0.374)
i 2.7  (-0.135)
i  3.1 (0.142)  2.7 (0.029)  2.4 (0.029)  2.8 (-0.319)
i  3.2 (0.086)  1.9 (-0.210)
i 2.8  (-0.153) 
Consumer/Automobile Org.  3.7 (0.117)  4.8 (0.662)  2.9 (-0.002)  3.5 (0.296)  2.4 (-0.282)
i 2.2  (-0.240)
i 3.8  (0.674) 3.1  (-0.172)
i  2.9 (0.332)  4.6 (1.031) 
Humanitarian Aid/Human Rights/Minorities  3.6 (0.200)  3.8 (-0.020)  2.9 (0.093)  2.9 (-0.092)  2.6 (0.085)  2.4 (0.052)  2.9 (-0.003)  3.2 (0.029)  3.2 (0.703)  3.5 (0.022) 
Environment/Peace/Animal Rights  3.1 (-0.258)
i  3.8 (-0.017)  2.9 (0.174)  2.9 (-0.194)  2.7 (0.067)  2.7 (0.275)  3.2 (0.227)  3.2 (0.003)  2.6 (0.146)  3.5 (0.022) 
Church/Religious Org.  2.9 (-0.134)  3.5 (-0.261)
i  2.5 (-0.100)  2.5 (-0.331)
i 2.0  (-0.457)
i 2.0  (-0.116)
i 2.2  (-0.668)
i 2.4  (-0.229)
i 1.2  (-1.233)
i 2.2  (-0.193)
i 
Political Party  3.4 (-0.038)  4.2 (0.297)  3.0 (0.228) 3.3  (0.215) 3.2  (0.527) 2.5  (0.061)  3.3 (0.187)  3.6 (0.231)  2.1 (0.032)  3.0 (-0.370)
i 
Science/Education/Teachers/Parents 3.3  (-0.072)  3.5 (-0.086)  2.8 (0.104)  3.2 (0.153)  2.5 (-0.009)  2.4 (0.121)  2.7 (-0.199)
i  2.7 (-0.170)  2.3 (0.104)  2.9 (-0.052) 
Social Club, Young/Elderly/Women  3.0 (-0.250)
i  2.9 (0.087)  2.3 (-0.155)
i 2.5  (-0.230)
i 2.1  (-0.246)
i  2.3 (0.036)  2.5 (-0.137)  2.3 (-0.281)
i 2.0  (-0.137)
i 2.6  (0.076) 
            
Organization  IE IL IT LU  NL  NO  PL  PT SE SI 
Sport/Outdoor Activity  2.4 (0.142)  2.3 (0.093)  2.0 (0.045)  1.8 (0.117)  2.0 (0.116)  2.3 (0.001)  1.9 (0.015)  2.2 (0.147)  2.1 (0.060) 1.7  (0.033) 
Cultural/Hobby Club  3.0 (0.105)  2.3 (0.221)  2.6 (0.349)  2.2 (0.384)  2.6 (0.002)  2.8 (0.093)  2.1 (0.303)  3.0 (0.404)  2.6 (0.139) 2.2  (0.187) 
Trade Union  3.1 (-0.288)
i  3.5 (0.503)  2.0 (-0.405)
i 2.4  (-0.370)
i  3.2 (0.036)  3.0 (-0.099)  1.6 (-0.528)
i 2.5  (-0.566)
i 2.7  (-0.241)
i 1.7  (-0.461)
i 
Bus./Prof./ Farmers Org.  3.0 (-0.207)  4.2 (1.003)  2.7 (0.098)  2.6 (-0.226)  3.0 (0.010)  3.6 (0.326)  2.2 (0.008)  2.9 (-0.177)  3.2 (0.170)  2.1 (-0.009) 
Consumer/Automobile Org.  3.9 (0.300)  3.3 (0.136)  3.0 (0.145)  4.6 (1.481)  3.3 (0.166)  3.2 (-0.244)
i 2.1  (-0.196)
i  3.6 (0.358)  3.1 (-0.025)  2.5 (0.258) 
Humanitarian Aid/Human Rights/Minorities  3.7 (0.269)  2.8 (-0.190)  2.6 (-0.006)  2.5 (-0.324)  3.1 (0.014)  3.4 (0.065)  2.2 (-0.035)  3.1 (0.235)  2.8 (-0.194)
i 1.9  (-0.305)
i 
Environment/Peace/Animal Rights  3.6 (0.175)  2.7 (-0.282)
i  2.9 (0.192)  2.9 (-0.014)  2.9 (-0.233)
i  3.5 (0.004)  2.6 (0.337)  3.2 (0.143)  3.2 (0.069)  2.5 (0.179) 
Church/Religious Org.  2.5 (-0.217)
i 2.3  (-0.761)
i 2.2  (-0.318)
i 2.6  (-0.359)
i 2.5  (-0.210)
i 2.8  (-0.345)
i 1.5  (-0.391)
i 1.8  (-0.310)
i 2.6  (-0.300)
i 2.1  (-0.100)
i 
Political Party  3.3 (-0.299)
i 2.7  (-0.373)
i  2.7 (-0.001)  2.8 (-0.155)  3.5 (0.296)  3.4 (0.073)  2.3 (0.017)  2.9 (-0.102)  3.5 (0.482)  2.3 (0.112) 
Science/Education/Teachers/Parents 3.4  (0.087)  2.6 (-0.171)  2.8 (-0.031)  2.7 (-0.201)  2.9 (-0.044)  3.5 (0.244)  2.3 (0.203)  3.0 (0.088)  2.9 (0.009)  2.3 (0.053) 
Social Club, Young/Elderly/Women  2.9 (-0.067)  2.3 (-0.179)  2.6 (-0.069)
i 2.1  (-0.333)
i 2.8  (-0.152)
i 2.7  (-0.117)
i 2.4  (0.266) 2.6  (-0.220)
i  2.5 (-0.168)  2.0 (0.051) 
Average number of memberships among the members of a specific association type reported; Size corrected figures in brackets; i = isolated association type 